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Central bank independence (CBI) is a very important precondition for price stability. 
However, the empirical evidence for a correlation between both is relatively weak. In this 
paper, this weakness is countered with a) an extended measure of monetary commitment, 
which includes well-known criteria for CBI and external criteria such as convertibility and 
exchange rate regimes and b) the argument that monetary commitment can grant price 
stability best if it is backed by an adequate assignment of economic policy. An empirical 
assessment with data from four decades confirms the crucial role of monetary commitment 
for price stability. 
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In the past two decades, central bank independence (CBI) has been regarded as 
being the primary policy option to secure price (level) stability. Consequently, 
throughout the world, central banks have experienced an ever-increasing degree 
of CBI. Simultaneously, average world inflation has been decreased to a great 
extent. Despite these parallel developments, the direct statistical relationship 
between legal CBI and price stability is surprisingly weak, at least when 
calculated for both developing and developed countries (Arnone et al. 2006a). It is 
even more doubtful whether the observed correlation also reflects a causal 
relationship from high CBI to low inflation (e.g. Berger et al. 2001). 
This disappointing empirical evidence has induced a number of explanations 
ranging from a fundamental criticism to the notion of common third determinants 
for both CBI and inflation (Posen 1993, Forder 2005). The question arises 
whether CBI is an appropriate instrument for granting stability. Alternative 
suggestions focus directly on the central bankers and their relations to the 
government. However, the literature has provided many convincing arguments for 
applying policy rules rather than trusting individuals and their promises (e.g. 
Brennan and Buchanan 1981). This paper departs from here and argues that rules 
such as central bank independence are effective only in the presence of 
enforcement mechanisms. In other words, there is a missing link between central 
bank independence based upon statute reading and its credibility. The price level 
and its developments cannot be exclusively traced back to monetary policy rules, 
but also to other relevant variables, both institutional and macroeconomic ones. 
The goal of our paper is to develop a procedure to overcome on the one hand the 
obvious theoretical weaknesses, in particular with respect to the link between 
commitment and credibility, and on the other hand the empirically weak 
correlation between commitment and inflation by using a pool to regression 
model to consider a country's development over time appropriately. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present an 
overview about the literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical background of the 
paper and introduces our understanding of monetary commitment and credibility.  
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Two hypotheses are derived. In this section, the variables and data are introduced. 
The empirical assessment of the hypotheses for two samples of OECD countries 
over four decades is presented and discussed in section 5. Conclusions in section 
6 round off the paper.  
2. Monetary commitment in the literature 
Monetary commitment has been discussed in the literature extensively for about 
30 years. Although a widespread common belief that monetary policy should be 
rule bound and that central banks should be granted independence (CBI) has been 
developed over time, there is still controversy about details and about empirical 
evidence. This section is not meant to provide a survey, but to outline the basic 
contributions and to discuss the main theoretical and empirical problems and 
controversies as to indicate this paper’s perspective. Basic contributions to the 
field have been made by different schools of thought. Brennan and Buchanan 
(1981) as well as Hetzel (1997) argue that monetary commitment is a 
constitutional decision which can be justified by principal-agent problems 
between the public as principal and the government as agent (McCallum 1997). 
This view is strengthened by the neoclassical approach as put forward among 
others by Kydland and Prescott (1997) as well as Barro and Gorden (1983).  
As one practical policy option to remedy the principal agent problem, central bank 
independence can be granted. CBI is measured as the simple sum or as a weighted 
or unweighted average respectively of the various properties of central bank 
legislation (e.g. Parkin and Bade 1977, Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991, 
Cukierman 1992 respectively). This procedure has been subject to severe 
criticism. Forder (1996) argues that the concept of statute reading is 
methodologically flawed, as it gives no credit to informal rules and to actual 
behaviour. For instance, the central bank’s ability to conduct monetary policy may 
be limited despite a high degree of CBI due to exchange rate regimes set up by the 
government. He also claims that the statute of a central bank does not allow 
assessing the government’s commitment to stability. One important conclusion of 
this reasoning is that CBI must not be confused with credibility (Freytag 2005). 
Credibility of a policy is only given if the public has trust in the respective  
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legislation. Less fundamentally and accepting the concept of CBI in general, 
Posen (1993) argues that the financial sector is able to influence both the degree 
of central bank independence and inflation; its dislike of inflation causes both. 
Similarly, Hayo (1998) as well as de Jong (2002) argue that cultural aspects can 
exert pressure on the government to grant CBI and to keep inflation low. In other 
words, as legal CBI is endogenous, it may be difficult to use it as an exogenous 
variable for policy outcome. A third line of reasoning argues that CBI does not 
reflect the role of transparency and accountability of central banks. This neglect 
may partly explain problems with the empirical analysis (de Haan, Eijffinger and 
Waller 2005, chapter 4). 
One consequence of these criticisms would be to apply different commitment 
mechanisms (Hayo and Hefeker 2002) as a means to guarantee price stability. 
However, other mechanisms such as contracts for central bankers (Walsh 1995) or 
appointing a conservative central banker (Rogoff 1985) have even stronger flaws, 
as they do not provide a solution to the principal-agent problem. Theoretically, 
CBI or a similar commitment mechanism can be seen as the least problematic way 
to solve it. 
According to the theoretical controversy, the empirical evidence is indeed less 
clear than the proponents of CBI would theoretically claim. At least, it seems to 
be exaggerated to identify an “…overwhelming empirical evidence…” supporting 
the claim that CBI and inflation are negatively correlated, as de Jong (2002, p. 
675) does. In cross country studies
1, the empirical relation between legal 
indicators of CBI and price stability is positive, at least for a sample of 
industrialized countries and increasingly for transition economies. With respect to 
industrialized countries, all legal measures applied are negatively correlated with 
inflation. By contrast, for developing and transition countries, this relation is not 
that robust. Legal measures of CBI do not indicate a strong impact on inflation. 
The only significant negative correlation can be found between de-facto CBI 
measured as turnover rate of central banks’ CEOs and inflation. This result is 
disappointing, as both the turnover rate and inflation may be caused by the same 
                                                 
1   For an overview about the empirical literature concerning CBI and inflation see e.g. Berger 
et al. (2001, Table 1) as well as Eijffinger and de Haan (1996).  
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exogenous variable. The result again indicates that CBI does not imply credibility 
– it heavily depends on an enforcement mechanism.  
The empirical investigations do have a number of general problems. First, 
correlation does not necessarily imply causality (Berger et al. 2001). This can 
already be seen in the theoretical discussion. The degree of CBI is not 
exogenously given, but depends on historical experience. Granting CBI may also 
neglect accountability and leave too much room for central banks’ discretion. In 
addition, central banks’ behaviour can be directed at securing their high degree of 
independence (Forder 2005). Thus, a clear direction of causality is difficult to 
maintain. Second, cross section studies compare different countries at the same 
time and do not cover developments over time. In the literature, only a few pooled 
regressions have been run (ibid., Table 1). Third, it seems that heterogeneity with 
respect to the development level of countries plays a major role. In those countries 
where the rule of law is generally accepted, the legal status of the central bank is 
decisive for the success of its policy. In other countries, the correlation between 
the legal status and inflation is rather arbitrary.  
Hence the goal of our paper is to develop a procedure to overcome these 
theoretical weaknesses and empirical problems in three ways: First, we use an 
alternative and in comparison to CBI more comprehensive legal measure of 
monetary commitment, namely one that focuses on independence, but at the same 
time also includes central banks obligation to guarantee transparency and 
accountability as well as external aspects of commitment (Freytag 2001). Thereby 
we hope to measure the government’s commitment to price stability more 
comprehensively, because all actors’ responsibilities are assessed, and to obtain 
more valid empirical evidence. Although there is a somewhat more convincing 
univariate relationship than with alternative measures (Freytag 2001), this 
evidence is far from satisfying.  
Therefore, we second argue that granting CBI can raise credibility of monetary 
policy and guarantee price stability only if it is interpreted as part of the policy 
assignment. This implies for one that the number of policy objectives equals the 
number of policy instruments (Tinbergen 1952), next that the single components 
of economic policy are compatible with each other, in other words that a  
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consistent economic order exists (Eucken 1955). To ensure the adequate 
consideration of the policy assignment, not only formal economic policy rules are 
included, but also informal institutions, which exert influence on the outcome of 
monetary policy. Following this view, CBI is one of several important policy 
institutions necessary to secure price stability. The notion that institutional 
constraints are important for the effectiveness of policy rules has been 
increasingly considered in the literature in recent years (e.g. Keefer and Stasavage 
2001, Freytag 2005
2). In addition to this, the effects of a legal or constitutional 
policy rule are dependent on other macroeconomic factors. These have also to be 
taken into account.  
Third, we try to tackle some methodical problems that other studies have. 
Thereby, we incorporate long term relationships rather than just looking at cross 
country evidence. This can be done by using a pooled regression model to 
consider a country’s development over time appropriately. In addition, we 
concentrate on industrialized countries within the OECD to avoid problems with 
heterogeneity. 
3. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
The approach developed in this paper is theoretically based on the well-known 
rules versus discretion approach (basic: Kydland and Prescott 1977). Given that 
the government has several policy goals, it tries to maximize its utility function 
(UG) consisting of arguments such as price stability (low inflation π), employment 
(N) and fiscal means (S): ,...) , , ( S N U U G G π = . UG is negatively dependent on 
inflation and positively dependent on N and S. In OECD countries, one can 
assume that the fiscal problems are minor in comparison with the problem of 
unemployment. Therefore, the government seeks to minimise the following loss 
function (LG) with respect to inflation (π): 
2 * 2 ) ( 2 / 1 2 / 1 y y L t G G − + = β π , with  1 0 ≤ ≤ G ß , 
                                                 
2   The author shows for a sample of 29 countries, which pursued a monetary reform, that a 




where  ßG represents the weight the government assigns to the employment 
(output) objective. The current aggregate output yt can be stimulated by a surprise 
inflation (Phillips relation): 
t
e
t t t y ε π π + − = , with ε representing a random shock.  
Then, the minimisation process results in an optimal inflation rate π, which is 
positively dependent on ßG. It is positive, if the government assigns a positive 












Assuming rational expectations, the increase in inflation does not raise output to 
the desired level y* in the long run. Instead, the individuals will acknowledge that 
the surprise inflation does not increase their real income, and employment – if it 
has risen in the short run – will decrease again and thus remain constant in the 
long run. From a political perspective, the government may be tempted to create 
an upswing in the business cycle e.g. prior to elections. The direct real effects of a 
political business cycle are zero. However, as the increase in inflation has 
negative consequences on growth (Barro 1995), this outcome presents a strong 
economic rationale for separating the objective of price stability from other policy 
objectives. By doing this, the government can use as many instruments to 
economic policy as it identifies policy objectives. Additionally, it makes sense to 
assigning monetary policy to an independent agency, called central bank, with an 
ncentive structure resulting in a simple loss function (LCB): 
2 π = CB L .  
Minimising this loss function leads to the optimal inflation rate  0 = π .  
Thus, the government’s utility function can be analytically separated into 
individual utility functions of several governmental agencies, which have the task 
to implement special economic policies. The central bank’s utility function 
contains price stability as only goal. Following a standard neoclassical policy 
assignment, the (narrowly defined) government’s utility function contains 
economic growth, whereas the social partners seek to maximise employment.  
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Each optimisation process takes place under the constraint to consider the other 
policy objectives. The individual policymaker’s decision-making process then is 
not disturbed by an alleged trade-off between policy objectives within the same 
loss function. This analysis confirms the economic case for the government to 
commit to price stability and grant central bank independence, as assigning 
monetary policy to an independent central bank obliged to meet the goal of price 
stability (instrument independence, Debelle and Fischer 1995) can be interpreted 
as a commitment device.  
A crucial topic is the measurement of commitment. In general, it is measured as 
the weighted average of criteria assessing the relation between government and 
central bank with respect to monetary policy. The coding is restricted between 0 
and 1 (Cukierman 1992). Throughout this paper, we use a comprehensive concept 
of monetary commitment (MC), which includes all components of conventional 
measures of CBI (in particular: Cukierman 1992, pp. 371-378), the central bank’s 
accountability as well as external aspects of commitment, namely the exchange 
rate regime, convertibility restrictions, completive elements in monetary policy 
and the question of who decides on exchange rate policy (Freytag 2001).
3 By 
including accountability into MC, the central bank’s responsibilities as part of the 
commitment to stability are considered. The reason for including external 
components is that our measure comprehensively captures the commitment of the 
government to stability. 
However, as seen above commitment does not necessarily imply credibility of 
monetary policy. What the government announces to do is not under any 
circumstances what it really will do. This holds in particular if the assignment 
problem is not solved in a way that the different policy instruments are 
compatible. Assume that the government grants independence to the central bank 
and at the same time organises the labour market with a centralised wage 
negotiation scheme exclusively left to unions and employers associations. In the 
short run, the outcome of this negotiation process may be contradictory to price 
stability, if it raises nominal wages far beyond productivity growth. The central 
bank then has the choice to accommodate this nominal wage increase or to follow 
                                                 
3 See  Annex 3 for details of the index of commitment.  
8 
 
a policy directed at price stability accepting increasing unemployment in the 
country.
4 The incompatibility of the labour market regime and the monetary 
regime causes tensions and leads to a situation of one objective inevitably missed. 
Private agents with rational expectations will not believe in inconsistent policy 
announcements. Their economic decisions (about wages and other long-term 
contracts) will make the monetary commitment incredible and will lead to time 
inconsistency, i.e. the government facing the incentive to deviate from the 
announced policy path.  
The missing link between the inflation rate as the outcome of monetary policy and 
the de jure independence of the central bank is the public’s behaviour with respect 
to long term contracts. This behaviour depends on how credible the monetary 
commitment is. Credibility itself depends on the compatibility of the components 
of economic order or institutional aspects respectively with the legal monetary 
regime. This compatibility has two dimensions, which are closely related. The 
first dimension is economic rationality, implying that the policy assignment is 
adequate to meet the policy objectives price stability, full employment and 
economic growth without interferences. To convince the public of its sincerity to 
strive for these objectives the government also has to consider the second 
dimension, namely political economy of the assignment. A strong signal to back 
monetary commitment with rules and/or behaviour in other policy areas certainly 
raises the credibility of monetary policy. Thus, statute reading indeed does make 
sense: to judge the credibility of a promise, it is important to relate it to de facto 
constraints, in this case the institutional setting. 
Next, we need to identify those (formal and informal) components of economic 
order that contribute to the credibility of a monetary policy commitment and the 
discussion of the way, in which these components are connected to monetary 
policy. These institutions are well covered by the index of economic freedom 
(EF) (Gwartney et al. 2002). This index consists of 5 groups: 
                                                 
4  This scenario is not unlikely; it indeed reflects the case of Israel in the early 1980s, where 
the government was even part of the wage bargaining process. A monetary reform with 
strict monetary commitment failed due to the results of these tripartite and centralized wage 
negotiations, which did not consider the objective of price stability. Only after the monetary 
regime was made more flexible (via a crawling peg) and the disinflation program was made  
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(1) Size of government, including information about government 
consumption, subsidies and taxes. 
(2) Legal system, consisting of information about property rights, judiciary 
independence, impartial courts, intellectual property rights, the role of 
military in politics and general acceptance of the law. 
(3) Monetary soundness, not considered in this analysis (as we want measure 
the effect of economic freedom on monetary soundness, i.e. inflation). 
(4) Freedom to trade with foreigners, including information about barriers to 
trade and capital restrictions. 
(5) Regulation, including banking regulation, labour market regulation, 
business regulation and corruption.  
The index covers almost all important institutional aspects and is grounded on de 
jure and de facto institutions. The value of the index is the higher, the smaller the 
government (including taxes), the better legally protected the citizens, the higher 
freedom to trade and the less regulated the labour market. To make it useful for 
our purpose, the index is adjusted by norming its values between 0 and 1 and by 
omitting monetary soundness; the expected correlation with inflation is negative. 
It is reasonable to argue that to be successful a strong monetary commitment 
requires a high degree of fiscal stability, a high degree of openness and a flexible 
labour market. High economic freedom exerts pressure on governments to stick to 
their policy announcements, as it leaves more options for the citizens. Costs of 
reneging are high.  
In a final step, we combine MC and EF to construct a proxy for ex-ante credibility 
designed to analyse whether or not the public trusts an announcement in advance 
(Cred1 and Cred2). Theoretically, the credibility of a monetary regime is the 
higher, the higher cost a deviation from a commitment causes for the government. 
Therefore, the interaction term of MC and EF is negatively correlated with 
inflation, as both variables are negatively correlated with inflation.  
                                                                                                                                      
less ambitious in 1985, inflation could be reduced sustainably in Israel (Freytag 2002, pp. 
143f and 156).  
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In addition, there are control variables to estimate the determinants of inflation. 
Some new research has been devoted to cultural aspects (Hayo 1998). The 
argument goes as follows. The public attitude towards inflation is extremely 
important for both the monetary commitment and the resulting inflation rate. A 
high public regard of price stability raises political costs of inflation for the 
government. We take this into account with an attitude dummy for the 1990s 
(ATT) as well as with an EMU dummy for the 1990s (EMU). The amount of 
foreign trade (TR) can also have contradictory effects on inflation. On the one 
hand, foreign trade causes intensive competition and better allocation of resources 
and factors implying a lower inflation rate (Romer 1993). On the other hand, 
higher demand for domestic goods can increase their prices contributing to higher 
inflation.  
Moreover, macroeconomic variables play a role in explaining inflation in a more 
traditional fashion: a high GDP growth (dGDP) may be positively correlated with 
inflation in less developed countries. However, in our sample of 20 developed 
OECD countries, GDP growth may also imply an efficient allocation of resources, 
efficient government activities and low distortions – there is no need for the 
government to abuse monetary policy. Put differently, in low growth countries, 
inflation may be higher (stagflation). We expect a negative correlation. By 
contrast, the actual wage development (dW), i.e. fast growing wages as well as 
price shocks (Shock) can increase the inflation rate. Wage pressure cannot be 
totally ignored by the central bank, and may lead to an increase in money growth, 
causing an increase in inflation. Finally, a price shock such as a sudden increase 
in the prices for natural resources, can also add to inflation.
5 The theoretical 
considerations suggest the following two hypotheses with respect to the 
correlation of central bank independence and inflation: 
Hypothesis 1: In OECD countries inflation is the lower, the higher the degree of 
monetary commitment, the degree of fiscal stability, the degree of openness, the 
flexibility of labour markets and the inflation culture. 
                                                 
5   It may be seen as appropriate to add the lagged endogneous variable. However, as we 
measure average inflation over a decade, we argue that the average CPI of the past decade 
has only a modest influence on the current decade’s average CPI. Each decade is 
characterized by events, which have a bigger influence than past experience.   
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Î  ) , , , ), ( , , ( Shock dW dGDP TR EMU ATT EF MC f = π . 
Hypothesis 1 refers to the economic rationality of economic policymaking. An 
adequate neo-classical policy assignment allows for price stability as other 
objectives are assigned own instruments. 
Hypothesis 2: In OECD countries inflation is negatively correlated with the 
degree of credibility, defined as a fixed relation between institutional constraints 
and the index of monetary commitment.  
Î  ) , , , ), ( , ( Shock dW dGDP TR EMU ATT y credibilit f = π ; 
Î ) , ( EF MC f y credibilit = , 
Hypothesis 2 is directed at the political rationality of economic policymaking. If 
the public – having rational expectations – is convinced about the adequacy of the 
assignment and the sincerity of the government’s announcements, its plans will 
give reasons for time consistent policy.  
4. Empirical results 
The econometric analysis has the goal to empirically test our two hypotheses, 
hence it is directed at explaining the impact of monetary commitment and 
institutional factors on a decade’s average consumer price inflation. The structure 
of the data strongly suggests applying a pooled regression fixed effects model for 
four periods and 20 OECD countries.
6 To control for international spillovers, we 
also test the model for a subsample of 14 small open economies (excluding the 
USA, the UK, France, Germany, Italy and japan). Fixed effects are necessary to 
take country specific factors appropriately into account.  
For hypothesis 1 we obtain:  
it
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 with  20 ,..., 1 = i  (countries) and  4 ,..., 1 = t  (decades from 1960s through 1990s). 
Hypothesis 2 is tested by: 
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with 20 ,..., 1 = i  and  4 ,..., 1 = t . 
The independent variables for the institutional set ups and for the credibility are 
specified as follows: 
1.  MC is generally measured by assessing the central bank law with respect to 
the ability of the central bankers to pursue a stability oriented monetary policy 
free of political influence. Thus ten criteria (see Annex 3)
 7 are introduced and 
given numerical values, which are averaged either weighted or unweighted. 
The data is available from the 1960s to the 1990s. The information for MC for 
the 1990s is taken from Cukierman (1992), Freytag (2001), central bank’s 
websites (IWP 2003) and IMFb. 
2.  To measure the institutional setting, we use a comprehensive measure, namely 
the index of economic freedom by Gwartney et al. (2002) resolved for section 
3 (access to sound money). It is also restricted between 0 and 1. A higher 
value implies a higher degree of economic freedom. The variable EF is 
available for the years 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000. As the 
index in the very year reflects developments of the past, we argue that the 
1970 value represents the institutional setting of the 1960s, that the average of 
the values for 1975 and 1980 represents the 1970s and so forth. Thus, we 
obtain four observations per country. 
3.  In hypothesis 2, we argue that the public is able to assess the economic order. 
The compatibility of the monetary regime with other policy areas is important 
for its credibility. This hypothesis demands for an ex-ante proxy of credibility. 
Otherwise, we would be unable to test the hypothesis. The compatibility of the 
monetary commitment with the institutional setting is calculated by the sum of 
MC and EF, the index of economic freedom:  ) ( 1 EF MC Cred + = . The higher 
the sum of MC and EF, the higher the credibility of the monetary regime and 
the higher the variable Cred1. Therefore, the expected influence on inflation is 
negative. A strong alternative version of the credibility variable is the product  
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of MC and EF:  EF MC Cred * 2 = . If both monetary commitment and 
economic freedom are high (close to one), credibility also is high (close to 
one). If both indicators are low (close to zero), credibility is also low (close to 
zero). The expected impact of Cred2 is negative. 
4.  A dummy called ATT is taking the value 1 for the 1990s, as in this period all 
countries changed their central bank law. It is a proxy for an increased public 
preference for stability. We alternatively use EMU, which takes the value 1 
for the EMU members in the 1990s. 
5.  TR as a measure for foreign trade is calculated from the sum of exports and 
imports divided by GDP and multiplied with 2:  2 * / ) ( GDP M X OP + = ; it is 
available from the 1960s through the 1990s. The data is from Heston, 
Summers and Aten (2002). 
6.  We also assess the influence of real GDP growth (dGDP) on inflation, 
assuming a negative impact on inflation. Again, the data is from Heston, 
Summers and Aten (2002). 
7.  The variable dW displays the increase in average wages in a country per 
decade. The data is from IMFa. 
8.  A shock variable (dummy) for the 1970s (two oil price shocks) is applied.  
9.  Finally, for the subsample “small open economies” we use the CPI in the US 
for the same period as control variable. 
The endogenous (dependent) variable is average consumer price inflation (CPI) 
for the very decade. Consumer price inflation is calculated on the basis of IFS 
statistics (IMFa). The data is calculated annually, and averages are taken. The 




MC EF Cred1 Cred2 ATT/
EU 




- -  -  -  - +/- -  +  +  + 
 
                                                                                                                                      
7  See also the studies by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Parkin and Bade (1977),  
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The results of the pooled regression using the White cross-section correction 
method in the basic model for the entire sample are shown in tables 1 through 5. 
The regressions are done using two samples. The first sample covers the period 
from the 1970s through the 1990s, as the world-wide economic policy setting 
concerning exchange rates and capital restriction changed in the early 1970s 
(tables 1 and 3). The dependent variable in all cases is consumer price inflation, 
measured as the average annual change in consumer prices of the respective 
decade (CPI). Equation 1 deals with hypothesis 1, whereas equations 2 and 3 
assess hypothesis 2. In tables 2, 4 and 5, we show the results of estimating the 
second sample including the 1960s to see whether or not the structural break after 
1971 is a problem for the relationship between CPI and our independent variables.  
In general, the empirical evidence of our econometric analysis is encouraging and 
confirms our two major hypotheses to a considerable degree. Monetary 
commitment in conjunction with the institutional setting can explain the 
development of inflation (CPI) very well. Following our hypotheses 1, inflation is 
indeed decreasing the higher the degree of monetary commitment and the higher 
the degree of economic freedom. The empirical results of table 1 also make 
evident that a comprehensive measure of monetary commitment is well suited to 
catch the relation between commitment and inflation. Also our hypotheses 2 is 
confirmed, which means that a monetary commitment can gain credibility and 
facilitate price stability, if it is compatible with the economic order. 
 
a) The full sample 
In table 1, the first regression clearly shows that with the exception of the 
influence of wage increase (variable dW) the coefficient of MC has the 
quantitative largest influence and is with a t-value of -12 highly statistically 
significant. Then follows the independent variable foreign trade (measured as the 
doubled sum of exports and imports in per cent of GDP) with a positive sign, 
meaning the more open a country is the higher is a risk of inflation. The 
independent variable economic freedom (EF) is just statistically significant and 
                                                                                                                                      
Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman et al. (2002).  
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the negative statistically significant coefficient of the dummy variable ATT shows 
that there is an increase public preference for price stability. Obviously, the oil 
price shock variable has the expected positive statistically significant influence 
and also the real growth rate of GDP has the expected negative influence on 
inflation. 
Table 1:  Credibility and inflation: Pooled regression 1970s to 1990s 
Variable  1  2  3 
C  14.983*** (7.66)  16.489*** (16.15)  11.507*** (50.37) 
MC  -8.767*** (-12.19)     
EF  -5.579* (-1.92)     
Cred1    -8.453*** (-9.05)   
Cred2      -14.477*** (-10.33) 
ATT  -2.54*** (-10.5)  -2.273*** (-32.95)  -2.114*** (-42.4) 
TR  8.312*** (4.64)  7.854*** (5.64)  8.418*** (7.23) 
dGDP  -1.586*** (-10.68)  -1.544*** (-11.04)  -1.505*** (-13.1) 
dW  10.674*** (15.39)  10.923*** (18.71)  10.844*** (27.25) 
Shock  2.652*** (12.43)  2.475*** (13.72)  2.484*** (14.58) 
N  55  55   55 
adjR²  0.988  0.997  0.998 
F-Statistics  169.9  699.9  1,094.4 
t-statistics in parenthesis. 
Source: own calculations 
 
If we turn to equations 2 and 3 where we test our major hypotheses 2 (inflation in 
the OECD countries now is negatively correlated with a degree of credibility 
defined as a fixed relation within an institutional constraint and the index of 
monetary commitment), we see that the two independent variables Cred1 and 
Cred2 are highly statistically significant and have the expected negative sign and 
are quantitatively quite important. In equation 3 the independent variable Cred2 
has the quantitatively largest influence. If we summarize these results we see that 
all independent variables have the theoretically expected signs. If we start with  
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the monetary commitment (MC) it is highly significantly negatively correlated 
with the average consumer price inflation in every decade. The institutional 
setting, expressed as the degree of economic freedom (EF), has also a negative 
impact on the CPI, however less significant. All control variables are contributing 
to the explanation of the rate of CPI in all three decades. The change in public 
attitude toward inflation in the 1990s (ATT) as well as high GDP growth (dGDP) 
or reducing inflation, high trade, wage growth as well as the dummy variable for 
the oil price shock, increased the rate of CPI. When following our hypotheses 2, 
MC and EF are merged to the credibility variable. The other variables remain 
robust and are similarly important. Adding MC and EF ( Cred1) is the less 
convincing alternative, whereas the product of both increases the better value and 
thereby the relevance of credibility. So from the results in table 1 we assume 
equation 3 being the most important regression. 
In table 2, we widen the data sample and include the 1960s to see how robust the 
results are. At the end of the 1960s this decade was marked with the end of the 
Bretton Woods system and can be regarded as the period within which significant 
structural breaks in the world economy took place. If we first make an overall 
comparison, we immediately see, realized, that the results remain very stable 
when the 60s are added to the sample, with the exception, that the institutional 
setting (EF) has a wrong sign and is not statistically significant. This may be due 
to the fact that the 1960s are not covered by the data, the earliest documentation is 
from 1970. We use these data as a proxy for the 1960s. If we include the 1960s, as 
we have done in table 2, the weight and importance of some control variables 
increase, like the variable dW (wage increase), which has a coefficient of 10 
without the 1960s and increases to 15 including the 1960s. On the other hand, the 
influence of real growth decreases without the 1960s, the coefficient was 1.6 and 
including the 1960s the coefficient shrinks to 0.9. The most remarkable influence 
is the openness of an economy, measured with the independent variable (TR) (sum 
of exports and imports in % of GDP), here the coefficient had a value of 8.3 
without the 1960s and has now an increase of 19.7 including the 1960s. The 
influence of this estimated coefficient more then doubled.   
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Table 2:  Credibility and inflation: Pooled regression 1960s to 1990s 
Variable  4  5  6 
C  5.632 (1.68)  9.485*** (5.08)  6.219*** (.3.56) 
MC  -6.375*** (-12.42)     
EF  0.032 (0.01)     
Cred1    -5.936*** (-9.72)   
Cred2      -10.205*** (-11.51) 
ATT  -2.815*** (-8.13)  -2.383*** (-10.56)  -2,3*** (-14-6) 
TR  19.699*** (5.114)  16.877*** (3.6)  16.843*** (3.46) 
dGDP  -0.851*** (-5.37)  -0.78*** (-4.65)  0.806*** (-4.61) 
dW  15.71*** (61.96)  15.15*** (23.06)  15.389*** (16.21) 
Shock  2.733*** (18.77)  2.601*** (43.07)  2.67*** (39.51) 
N  65  65  65 
adjR²  0.994  0.997  0.998 
F-Statistics  386.6  782.5  1,624.7 
t-statistics in parenthesis. 
Source: see above 
 
In general, when we include the 1960s the control variables gain importance. One 
explanation for this may be, that in the 1960s the link between monetary 
commitment and inflation was weaker due to the problems related to the Bretton 
Woods system. With this we mean, that central banks more or less follow the U.S. 
monetary policy and that capital flows were restricted, both resulting in less 
commitment and less economic freedom. Summarizing our results, we can clearly 
confirm our two major hypotheses, which are: inflation in OECD countries is the 
lower the higher the degree of monetary commitment and the degree of economic 
freedom. In addition, inflation in OECD countries is negatively correlated with 
the degree of credibility, defined as a fixed relation between institutional 
constraints then the index of monetary commitment. Our results are quite robust 
to different specification and changing of the investigated time period.  
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b) The subsample “small open economies” 
In addition, we test our hypotheses for a subsample which contains the set of 
small open economie within the OECD. The motivation for dealing with this 
group is to estimate whether or not the results are driven by the major economies. 
In general, as shown in tables 1 and 2 the results are robust when the subsample of 
small open economies is used. Some interesting differences show up (Table 3).  
Table 3:  Credibility and inflation in small open economies:
1)  
Pooled regression 1970s to 1990s 
Variable  7  8  8 
C  18.573*** (14.64)  15.969*** (5.21)  12.102*** (3.97) 
MC  -6.116*** (-3.46)     
EF  -10.027 (-1.60)     
Cred1    -6.366*** (-5.29)   
Cred2      -10.351*** (-3.14) 
ATT  -2.888*** (-7.33)  -3.137*** (-10.04)  -3.151*** (-6.12) 
TR  2.211 (0.33)  3.330 (0.45)  4.086 (0.51) 
dGDP  -1.686*** (-14.85)  -1.738*** (-11.75)  -1.754*** (-11.20) 
dW  11.391*** (6.50)  11.380*** (5.43)  11.410*** (4.23) 
Shock  1.844*** (44.10)  2.084*** (7.60)  2.180*** (7.14) 
N  38  38  38 
adjR²  0.911  0.915  0.912 
F-Statistics  19.968  22.032  21.070 
t-statistics in parenthesis. 
1) Countries in this sample are the following ones: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finnland, Greece, Ireland, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland. 
Source: own calculations. 
 
To start with the differences (in comparison with the entire sample) for hypothesis 
1, the institutional constraint (EF) is no longer significant, and the estimated 
coefficient is much smaller. The same holds for the trade variable. Monetary 
commitment (MC) only looses a bit of its explanatory power, but remains strong  
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and statistically significant. The other variables have had an even stronger impact 
on CPI since the 1970s. As for hypothesis 2, both forms of credibility (Cred1 and 
Cred2) remain highly statistically significant, although they lose a bit of their 
explanatory power; both coefficient ant t-statistics are smaller than in table 1. The 
other variables are stronger than for the entire sample. An explanation for the 
weaker performance can be that small countries face higher competition from the 
world markets than bigger ones. Therefore, the increasing demand for domestic 
goods seems to have smaller impact on the price level.  
Table 4:  Credibility and inflation in small open economies:
1)  
   Pooled regression 1960s to 1990s 
Variable  10  11  12 
C  15.703*** (5.65)  14.398*** (5.22)  11.017*** (4.24) 
MC  -5.940*** (-3.92)     
EF  -7.707** (-2.76)     
Cred1    -6.008*** (-6.25)   
Cred2      -9.947*** (-3.59) 
ATT  -2.860*** (-7.92)  -2.990*** (-10.70)  -2.985*** (-6.50) 
TR  5.737 (0.97)  5.824 (1.11)  5.923 (1.11) 
dGDP  -1.758*** (-21.18)  -1.766*** (-24.83)  -1.764*** (-24.16) 
dW  13.934*** (3.23)  13.929*** (3.31)  13.932*** (3.07) 
Shock  2.110*** (9.68)  2.210*** (9.85)  2.257*** (10.98) 
N  43  43  43 
adjR²  0.870  0.875  0.873 
F-Statistics  15.009  16.494  16.191 
t-statistics in parenthesis. 
1) Countries in this sample are the following ones: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finnland, Greece, Ireland, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
When considering at the extended period from the 1960s through the 1990s 
(Table 4), the outcome also does not dramatically change. There are two major  
20 
 
changes. Trade (TR) is no longer significant, however EF is. In addititon the 
weight of the wage changes (dW) increases. Both credibility variables (Cred1 and 
Cred2) remain significant and the size of the estimated coefficients is roughly the 
same.  
Table 5:  Credibility and inflation in small open economies:
1)  
   Pooled regression 1960s to 1990s 
Variable  13  14  15 
C  15.628*** (10.36)  13.176*** (5.18)  9.656*** (3.89) 
MC  -6.009*** (-4.45)     
EF  -10.010*** (-3.18)     
Cred1    -6.178*** (-7.13)   
Cred2      -9.80*** (-3.69) 
ATT  -1.281* (-1.94)  -1.708** (-2.24)  -1.814* (-1.93) 
TR  -2.665 (-0.32)  -1.783 (-0.21)  -1.129 (-0.12) 
dGDP  -1.460*** (-5.70)  -1.499*** (-6.03)  -1.507*** (-5.93) 
dW  13.866*** (3.36)  13.914*** (3.32)  13.962*** (3.01) 
Shock  -0.631 (-0.51)  -0.217 (-0.16)  -0.027 (-0.02) 
US CPI  0.784** (2.49)  0.713* (2.05)  0.674* (1.81) 
N  43  43  43 
adjR²  0.875  0.879  0.935 
F-Statistics  14.954  16.211  15.760 
t-statistics in parenthesis. 
1) Countries in this sample are the following ones: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finnland, Greece, Ireland, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The estimation results do not change when the independent variable, US 
American consumer price inflation (US CPI) is added and has a statistically 
significant influence. Monetary commitment (MC), economic freedom (EF) and 
credibility (Cred1 and Cred2) remain significant and have a major impact on the 
dependent variable; changes in wage and GDP also keep their explanatory power.  
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Interestingly, the shock variable (Shock), the attitude variable (Att) and the trade 
variable (TR) become insignificant. Obviously, there is a substitutive effect 
between the dummy variables and trade on the one hand and the US inflation rate 
on the other hand.  
 
c) Somefurther robustness tests 
In general, the results show a high robustness and extremely high R²adj, even if 
we drop some variables and incorporate the 1960s as an additional period. The 
results are robust, all variables remain significant and the signs are also stable. We 
also test whether or not the results are driven by the fact that we estimate fixed 
effects. The Hausman test for the institutional variables (MC, EF, Cred1, Cred2) 
reveals that the estimators are consistent. As can be expected for the period 1970s 
through 1990s, the test has a higher significance level than for the longer period 
including the 1960s. This seems plausible. The three decades since 1970 are 
indeed characterized by a rather constant monetary policy.  
In addition, we test the entire sample without the US for three decades and four 
decades (tables A1 and A2 respectively). The results remain robust, except for the 
puzzling result that EF is insignificant for the period 1970s through 1990s (table 
A1) and becomes significant for the longer time span (table A2). Even for two 
short subperiods – the 1960s and 1970s in table A4 as well as the 1980s and 
1990s in table A3) the robustness is high. In the latter estimations we do not rely 
on fixed effects. In sum, the interpretation of the results is rather straightforward. 
5. Summary and policy conclusions 
The paper aims at giving an explanation for the “missing link” between de-jure 
monetary commitment and the inflation performance of OECD countries since the 
1950s. For this purpose, we use a comprehensive measure for monetary 
commitment, which includes internal aspects of CBI as well as external 
components such as convertibility restrictions and the exchange rate regime. We 
formulated two hypotheses, (1) in OECD countries inflation is the lower, the 
higher the degree of monetary commitment, the degree of fiscal stability, etc. and  
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(2) inflation is negatively correlated with the degree of credibility, defined as a 
fixed relation between institutional constraints and the index of monetary 
commitment. Both hypotheses are strongly confirmed by our pooled regressions. 
We also test the long run relationship between inflation and commitment by using 
again a pooled regression over three (respectively four) decades.  
Indeed, these extensions of the analysis help understanding the role of monetary 
commitment within the economic policy assignment. The obvious and expected 
outcome is that monetary commitment is important for the success of monetary 
policy. This has already been shown in the theoretical and partly in the empirical 
literature. However, our contribution reveals that commitment is at best a 
necessary condition; the sufficient condition seems to be an appropriate 
enforcement mechanism, however this mechanism cannot be modelled explicitly. 
Instead, institutional constraints are chosen. The higher the degree of economic 
freedom for the citizens, the less incentives politicians face to weaken stability 
oriented monetary policy. Our results become stronger when controls such as 
wage pressure, GDP growth, trade intensity and shock dummies are introduced. 
These results suggest that the public very well perceives the credibility of policy 
rules by relating the degree of monetary commitment with other policy areas. This 
relation can be (and obviously is) used as a concept to assess credibility of policy 
rules ex-ante. In the long run, the credibility of policy rules has an impact on the 
behaviour of the public with respect to contracts. This behaviour has implications 
for monetary policy.  
The policy lessons to be drawn are first that governments can increase overall 
welfare by committing to stability oriented monetary policy, e.g. by granting 
central bank independence. Second, such a commitment by governments is 
dependent on the quality of an enforcement mechanism. Third, other policy 
outcomes are relevant for the success of monetary policy. Higher growth, 




Annex 1:  List of variables, basic statistics 
 
Source: See section 4. 
 
Annex 2:  List of countries  
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK, USA. 
 
 ATT  CPI  Cred1 Cred2 EF  GDP  MC  TR  SHOCK  WAGE 
Mean  0.246 6.051 1.11 0.32 0.63  2.42  0.5  0.23  0.29  0.07 
Median  0.0  5.1  1.13 0.31 0.64  2.12  0.47 0.21  0.0  0.05 
Maximum  1.0  18.8  1.54 0.58 0.82  9.36  0.8  0.61  1.0  0.33 
Minimum  0.0  0.4  0.36 0.09 0.49  0.13  0.18 0.04  0.0  -0.07 
Std.  Dev.  0.43 4.08 0.28  0.13  0.07 1.33 0.18  0.12  0.46  0.07 
Skewness  1.179 0.83 -0.51 0.17  0.18 2.27 0.12  1.37  0.91  1.14 
Kurtosis  2.39 3.13 2.91  1.78  2.99 12.8 1.87  4.87  1.83  5.15 
                 
Jarque-Bera  16.06 7.56  2.83 4.32 0.37  315.85 3.61  29.69 12.72  26.54 
Probability 0.0003  0.023  0.24 0.12 0.83  0.0  0.16  0.0  0.0017  0.000002
                 
Sum 16.0  393.3  71.97 20.97 41.23 157.43 32.42 14.79 19.0  4.35 
Sum  Sq.  Dev.  12.06  1065.7  4.88 1.16 0.36  113.14 2.08 0.91  13.45  0.35 
                 
Observations  65 65 65  65  65 65 65  65  65  65 
Cross 
sections  20 20 20  20  20 20 20  20  20  20  
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Annex 3:  Index of monetary commitment 
Criterion Com-
ponent 
Explanation   Numerical 
codings 
Stated objectives of   obj  1. Price stability only goal  1.00
monetary policy    2. Other objectives mentioned   0.66
    3. Other objectives equally 
     important  
0.33
    4. No goals for monetary policy  0.00
    
Locus of legal   const 1.  Constitution  1.00
commitment    2. Central bank law  0.66
   3.  Decree  0.33
    4. Not fixed at all  0.00
    
Discretionary power   gov  1. No power left to the government  1.00
belonging to the 
government 
  2. Exchange rate only issue to be  
     consulted between government 
          and monetary authority  0.66
    3. Exchange rate regime completely 
        left to government  0.33
    4. Government may override central 
     bank as regards monetary policy 
0.00
    
Conditions of appoint-   ceo  1. CEO must be a reputed expert  1.00
ment and dismissal of     2. No expertise demanded  0.00
monetary CEO    
  diss  1. Appointment with fixed term and  
        dismissal only after criminal  
     offences and bad performance 
1.00
    2. No rules for dismissal  0.50
    3. Dismissal unconditioned or linked 
     to resignation of governments  
     and ministers 
0.00
     
Conditions of lending   limcred  1. No central bank credit allowed   1.00
to the government    2. Central bank credit allowed  
     conditionally 
0.50
    3. Central bank credit allowed  
     unconditionally 
0.00
     
  limprim  1. Central bank is not allowed to 
        purchase public bonds on the 
         primary market  1.00
    2. Central bank is allowed to 
        purchase public bonds in hard  
        currency on the primary market  0.66
    3. Central bank is allowed to 
         purchase public bonds in any cur      
rency on the primary market  
0.33
    4. No limitations on credit activities  0.00 
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Annex 3 (cont.) 
Supervision and   reg  1. Supervision and regulation is  
regulation of the         assigned to a separated body  1.00
financial system by the    2. Supervision and regulation is  
central bank        assigned to central bank  0.50
    3. No supervision and regulation  0.00
    
Accountability of the   acc  1. Obligation to inform the public  1.00
central bank    2. Obligation to inform the  
        parliament in public hearings  0.66
    3 Obligation to inform the 
        government without publicity  0.33
    4. No accountability  0.00
     
External pledges of   extern  1. Exchange rate fixed to a hard 
the government        currency and money base fully 
        backed with foreign reserves  1.00
    2. Exchange rate fixed  0.75
    3. Crawling peg  0.50
    4. Managed floating  0.25
    5. Free floating  0.00
     
Convertibility   conv  1. Full convertibility  1.00
restrictions    2. Partial convertibility  0.75
    3. Convertibility for current 
        account transactions only  0.50
    4. Convertibility for capital 
        account transactions only  0.25
    5. No convertibility  0.00
    
  mult  1. One exchange rate  1.00
    2. Multiple exchange rate  0.00
    
Interactions with   comp  1. A hard currency can be used  
other currencies        for all transactions  1.00
    2. A hard currency can be used  
        for some transactions, others 
    excluded 
0.66
    3. A hard currency may be held  0.33
    4. No holdings or transactions in  
        hard currencies allowed  0.00
 
Source: Freytag (2001, p. 198-199), own changes.  
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Annex 4 Robustness Tests 
Table A1: Credibility and inflation without the US:  
   Pooled regression 1970s to 1990s 
Variable  A1  A2  A3 
C  12.819*** (4.12)  14.372*** (35.01)  10.487*** (10.32) 
MC  -7.394*** (-3.95)     
EF  -3.097 (-0.42)     
Cred1    -6.812*** (-5.20)   
Cred2      -11.667*** (-3.98) 
ATT  -3.049*** (-4.96)  -2.795*** (-5.97)  -2.701*** (-4.78) 
TR  9.850** (2.06)  10.590*** (2.91)  10.892** (2.58) 
dGDP  -1.825*** (-10.62)  -1.770*** (-10.57)  -1.783*** (-12.22) 
dW  10.429*** (3.40)  10.568*** (5.08)  10.666*** (4.16) 
Shock  2.945*** (9.11)  2.884*** (26.88)  2.913*** (37.01) 
N  52  52  52 
adjR²  0.903  0.906  0.905 
F-Statistics  19.943  21.520  21.275 
t-statistics in parenthesis. 




Table A2: Credibility and inflation without the US:  
   Pooled regression 1960s to 1990s 
Variable  A4  A5  A6 
C  5.289 (0.742)  6.496 (1.05)  4.177 (0.80) 
MC  -5.114*** (-2.60)     
EF  -1.652*** (-0.22)     
Cred1    -4.571** (-2.10)   
Cred2      -8.386** (-2.15) 
ATT  -3.001*** (-3.51)  -2.826*** (-5.23)  -2.676*** (-4.95) 
TR  20.423 (1.64)  20.798* (1.70)  20.755* (1.74) 
dGDP  -0.644 (-1.40)  -0.597 (-1.40)  -0.623 (-1.46) 
dW  15.775** (2.19)  15.853*** (2.26)  15.890** (2.24) 
Shock  2.722*** (7.95)  2.670*** (8.19)  2.669*** (8.73) 
N  61  61  61 
adjR²  0.794  0.799  0.800 
F-Statistics  10.259  10.940  11.012 
t-statistics in parenthesis. 




Table A3: Credibility and inflation: Pooled regression 1980s to 1990s 
Variable  A7  A8  A9 
C  11.340 (1.48)  6.798*** (3.06)  5.908*** (2.14) 
MC  -3.206** (-1.89)     
EF  -8.380 (-1.14)     
Cred1    -2.864* (-2.44)   
Cred2      -6.077 (-1.48) 
ATT  -2.308*** (-5.26)  -2.555*** (-18.06)  -2.473*** (-6.83) 
TR  4.527*** (9.98)  5.530*** (3.18)  5.127*** (5.13) 
dGDP  -0.518 (-0.55)  -0.338 (-0.53)  -0.446 (-0.58) 
dW  39.420*** (4.32)  44.362*** (21.22)  43.849*** (10.51) 
Shock       
N  36  36  36 
adjR²  0.643  0.645  0.647 
F-Statistics  11.488  13.701  13.846 
t-statistics in parenthesis. 




Table A4: Credibility and inflation: Pooled regression 1960s to 1970s 
Variable  A10  A11  A12 
C  6.918 (1.39)  5.276* (1.73)  5.876** (2.38) 
MC  -6.591*** (-5.38)     
EF  -1.520 (-0.30)     
Cred1    -2.990 (-1.49)   
Cred2      -9.985*** (-2.66) 
ATT       
TR  -0.838 (-0.68)  -0.518 (-0.53)  -0.956 (-0.72) 
dGDP  -0.179 (-0.77)  0.023 (0.11)  -0.162 (-0.56) 
dW  16.420*** (34.00)  15.641*** (198.96)  15.774*** (54.88) 
Shock  5.403*** (9.55)  5.818*** (16.96)  5.355*** (10.19) 
N  29  29  29 
adjR²  0.790  0.754  0.801 
F-Statistics  18.566  18.189  23.594 
t-statistics in parenthesis. 
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